Thursday, February 14, 2008

A Good Article

I just found a good article on Reinado. It confirms my suspicions
that the petitioners may have a worthy cause - certainly a cause
that many people support - but perhaps not the best leader.

Instead of providing a link, I think I will just paste it in full.

Wednesday, 13 February 2008

Rebel's death a chance for unity Michael Leach

When I wrote on Monday that disarming the increasingly
threatening and erratic Major Alfredo Reinado had become
a critical priority for national unity in East Timor, there was
little indication that these concerns could be so dramatically
realised within hours.

Monday morning's tragic events were the precipitous
endpoint of an ill-defined "negotiation" with an erratic but
charismatic fugitive wanted for serious crimes arising from
the 2006 crisis.

Jose Ramos Horta, the hero of the diplomatic front in the
resistance struggle, now fights for his life in a Darwin hospital.
Once again the culture of the gun and covert resistance threatens
to overwhelm a nascent culture of democratic opposition. This
culture is a hybrid legacy of Timor's desperate clandestine
struggle against Indonesian occupation, but also of the Indonesian
military habit of elevating military thugs to local warlord status,
and awarding them a semi-legitimate "second function" as
political figures.

In the short-term, it is likely that Monday's events will cause
further instability as Reinado's hard-core supporters struggle
to come to grips with a changed reality. However, in the
mid-term they may prove a circuit-breaker. Having attacked
two national heroes, and grievously wounded one, the context of
Reinado's death will severely limit the capacity of his supporters to
make him a political martyr. The rumours now circling in Dili that
he is "not dead", or the absurd exculpatory rumour that two
coordinated, unscheduled armed intrusions at 6am were a
"negotiation" strategy gone wrong, attest to the difficulty of
spinning these events in a politically useful way.

The position of Reinado's gang, which includes the petitioners'
leader Salsinha, apparently implicated in the attack on Prime
Minister Xanana Gusmao, is now politically untenable. It is likely
that large numbers of the petitioners will seek to distance themselves
quickly from their discredited erstwhile leader. It should be recalled
that Reinado was not originally one of the petitioners, but the leader
of a separate breakaway group of military police.

He has since aligned with them to provide a fig leaf to his own case,
which ultimately consisted of little more than a refusal to face justice
outside his own terms. As others have noted, this stance greatly
complicated the resolution of the petitioners' grievances.

It is well know that as president, Gusmao strongly opposed the
original sacking of the petitioners. With Reinado gone, the Prime
Minister's credibility with this group should aid him in resolving their
complaints. Indeed, it seems likely that a smaller group of petitioners
had recently broken away to make a deal, isolating Reinado from some
of his support base and perhaps setting him on his final path of
destruction. Sadly, the Government's strategy did not include
disarming a dangerous renegade as first priority.

For their part, the Government must swiftly move to give the
petitioners a clear choice: disown Salisnha and the remnants of the
Reinado group and accept a suitable assistance package for their
legitimate grievances, or face legal association with culprits in
Monday's attack.

Some have noted, with irony, that Ramos Horta was leading the
negotiations. This is an unfair view as the new alliance Government
contained some key figures sympathetic to Reinado. Ramos Horta's
hand was somewhat forced in order to maintain unity in the new
Government.

It is also true that the Australian Defence Force attack on Reinado's
base ended up a public relations problem for the new Government,
with its capacity to discredit the International Stabilisation Force
presence in the eyes of many Timorese.

Sensitivity is demanded in the conduct of the Australian military.
Its presence is clearly essential, but there are questions of public
perception. Once renegade groups are disarmed, the Federal
Government must ask whether a standing army in Dili is the best
model for East Timor.

The increased Australian police presence signalled by Rudd is a
welcome move. In the long run, a reserve defence force presence,
behind a police-fronted mission may be preferable.

Finally, long-standing divisions within the political elite, and the
failure to sustain a unifying vision beyond the independence struggle
lies behind much of the strife. As Ramos Horta lies wounded, it is
clearly time to for the political elite to heal their rifts and unite with
younger leaders to consign the culture of the gunmen to history.

Michael Leach, a research fellow at Deakin University, visited the
eastern region of Timor-Leste last month to research relationships
between modern and traditional authorities.

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